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475 
DISCLOSURE AS DISTRIBUTION 
Jeremy N. Sheff* 
Abstract: This brief response to the work of Professors Omri Ben-Shahr and Carl 
Schneider on mandated disclosure regimes investigates the normative criteria underlying 
their claim that those regimes are failures. Specifically, it unpacks the pieces of those 
authors’ implicit cost-benefit analysis, revealing inherently normative judgments about desert 
and responsibility at the core of their (or any) critique of disclosure regimes. Disclosure 
regimes may aim to improve human decisionmaking behaviors, but those behaviors are 
influenced in non-deterministic ways by cognitive capacities that are heterogeneously 
distributed among subjects of the regimes. Accordingly, any claim regarding the normative 
desirability of disclosure regimes (or any other regulatory regime that seeks to channel and 
improve decisionmaking) implicitly rests on judgments regarding individuals’ responsibility 
for their own capacities. I argue that in evaluating such regulatory regimes, focusing on 
efficiency through cost-benefit analysis distracts from inescapable and logically prior 
distributive questions regarding desert and responsibility. 
INTRODUCTION 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider have done legal scholars and 
policymakers a tremendous service by collecting, in one place,1 various 
clues and traces of an undeniable truth: that regulatory regimes built on 
the compelled disclosure of information are endemic, and can be 
problematic. Reviewing their comprehensive research, I find little if 
anything to add to their identification of various instances of mandated 
disclosure regimes, nor of their analysis of the practical effects of those 
regimes—certainly nothing beyond the points already raised by 
Professor Craswell in his response to their project.2 So instead, I would 
like to focus on the normative implications of the evidence and analysis 
Professors Ben-Shahar, Schneider and Craswell have assembled, an 
issue which still calls for further development. Like Professor Craswell, 
I will question whether the phenomenon of mandated disclosure—as 
documented by Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider—can properly be 
                                                     
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John’s University. I am grateful to the organizers of the 
Washington Law Review Symposium on “The Crisis of Mandated Disclosure,” at which I presented 
a version of this response, and to Professor Zahr Said for the invitation to do so. 
1. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 647 (2011). 
2. Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Success or 
Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 335–37, 354–59 (2013). 
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characterized as a “failure,” if only to clarify what we mean when we 
use such a pejorative term. 3 
If mandated disclosure has failed, certainly we should be able to say 
with confidence what it has failed to do: to what end is mandated 
disclosure supposed to serve as a means? But beyond that, we will also 
have to defend that end as one worth attaining: some normative 
commitment must justify whatever ends the legal regime might serve. So 
the purpose of my response is both to expand on Professor Craswell’s 
efforts to identify possible ends for mandated disclosure regimes, and to 
assess the normative commitments underlying those ends—
commitments on which Craswell, Ben-Shahar and Schneider seem to 
agree, if only in their assumptions. 
I. IDENTIFYING NORMATIVE SYSTEMS 
In his symposium presentation, Professor Schneider identified two 
species of “disclosurites”—proponents of mandated disclosure.4 The 
first species, he explained, appears to be motivated by concerns over 
dignity or autonomy. They claim that there is a moral obligation to 
respect this principle of autonomy by providing information to 
disclosees, regardless of the disclosures’ costs, or of their actual effects 
on the disclosees’ decisionmaking.5 But assuming Professor Schneider’s 
characterization of this species of disclosurite is accurate, as far as they 
are concerned one cannot characterize mandated disclosure as a failure 
at all. To the contrary, it accomplishes precisely what it should—it 
satisfies disclosers’ moral obligations to respect disclosees’ autonomy. 
So with respect to the autonomy-based argument in favor of 
disclosure, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider are not really proving a 
failure, nor do I believe they claim to. Instead, they simply have a 
normative disagreement with some proponents of mandated disclosure, 
and have not attempted to justify their own normative framework as 
superior to the alternative espoused by those proponents. Specifically, 
they differ with autonomy-focused disclosurites as to the moral 
implications of disclosure and the appropriate scope, content, or value of 
autonomy or dignity in public policy—though they don’t really join the 
                                                     
3. Id. at 1–2. 
4. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 681 (outlining “free-market” and “autonomy” 
principles underlying disclosure mandates); see also Craswell, supra note 2, at 339. 
5. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 681 (“[M]andated disclosure serves the 
autonomy principle. It supposes that people make better decisions for themselves than anyone can 
make for them and that people are entitled to freedom in making decisions.”). 
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normative argument over what that scope, content, or value ought to be. 
Nor, for that matter, does Professor Craswell, who concedes that such a 
critique is outside his area of expertise.6 The bare fact of this normative 
disagreement is nevertheless important, because it demonstrates that a 
plausible set of normative criteria exist under which mandated disclosure 
is not a failure, but a success. This being the case, the characterization of 
mandated disclosure as a failure requires some defense of an alternative 
set of normative criteria as superior. And as I intend to argue, the 
normative criteria Professors Ben-Shahar, Schneider, and Craswell 
appear to adopt have more in common with the autonomy-based 
framework than they seem to realize. 
The other class of disclosurites Professor Schneider identified in his 
remarks appear to be working within a normative framework that 
Professors Ben-Shahar, Schneider, and Craswell all support. We can 
glean traces of this framework from Professors Ben-Shahar’s and 
Schneider’s Article. They note that policymakers and legislators 
frequently mandate disclosure as a solution to various perceived “‘social 
problems,’” and that these social problems are often illusory 
extrapolations of “‘individual acts of malfeasance.’”7 They assert that 
disclosure is a policy measure that “aspires to improve decisions people 
make in their economic and social relationships and particularly to 
protect the naïve from the sophisticated.”8 And they note that the tool for 
achieving this aspiration is “requiring the revelation of information.”9 So 
we have some hints at the ends that Professors Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider think mandated disclosure ought to pursue: protecting naïfs 
from harm caused by the decisions they make when interacting with 
sophisticates who might benefit from those same decisions. The means 
to that end—the “revelation of information” to the naïfs—is, they 
maintain, supposed to “improve decisions” made by those naïfs, 
presumably so as to avert the harms they would otherwise suffer.10 
                                                     
6. Craswell, supra note 2, at 339. 
7. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 680 (quoting EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. 
KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 23 
(Transaction Publishers 2d prtg. 2003) (1982)). 
8. Id. at 649. 
9. Id. at 720. 
10. The standard by which a decision may be deemed “improved” is nowhere explicitly stated, 
though Professor Craswell offers a plausible metric for the consumer protection context: the extent 
to which a disclosure (d) changes consumer beliefs regarding a product’s quality (r) to be more 
consistent with some presumably objective measure of that same quality (s), leading consumers to 
purchase the optimal number of those products given the risk of loss represented by s. Craswell, 
supra note 2, at 381–83. 
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However, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider further hold that 
these benefits to naïfs cannot in themselves justify disclosure. “Whatever 
benefits mandated disclosures may offer,” they say, “mandates are 
unjustifiable if their costs outweigh their benefits.”11 This, then, appears 
to be a normative claim grounded in cost-benefit analysis, a staple tool 
of consequentialist normative systems such as the welfarism typical of 
the economic analysis of law.12 Professor Craswell—no stranger to this 
mode of thinking—goes so far as to explicitly adopt such cost-benefit 
analysis as his normative criterion for assessing the justifiability of 
disclosure mandates and alternative consumer protection regimes.13 So 
all three authors would appear to be willing to defend (or assume) 
something like a welfarist normative framework as superior to the 
autonomy-based framework they all seem to dismiss. As such, they 
would have us quantify both the benefits and the costs of disclosure, and 
then net them against each other. Importantly, these are two separate 
steps, and the separation between them complicates the normative 
framework Ben-Shahar, Schneider, and Craswell would have us adopt. 
II. CAUSATION, COSTS, AND BENEFITS 
Assuming that a welfarist framework applied through cost-benefit 
analysis is in fact the most defensible one, how might it lead to a 
conclusion that mandated disclosure fails? Presumably a legal regime 
will “fail” cost-benefit analysis if it leads to benefits that are too small 
relative to its costs, which are relatively too large, all measured against 
some relevant baseline. And on the benefit side, Professors Ben-Shahar 
and Schneider have assembled an impressive array of evidence and 
analysis that ought to convince us that mandated disclosure very often 
fails to completely achieve ends they have set for it—the avoidance of 
harms to naïfs through the improvement of the naïfs’ decisionmaking. 
But the absence of total success is not the same thing as failure. As 
Professor Craswell points out, there may be other “dynamic” benefits to 
disclosure—such as providing sophisticates incentives to alter their 
                                                     
11. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 735. 
12. See Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHILOS. 463, 468 (1979) (defining the 
moral criterion of welfarism as “[t]he judgment of the relative goodness of alternative states of 
affairs must be based exclusively on, and taken as an increasing function of, the respective 
collections of individual utilities in these states”); see generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) (a description and defense of a welfarist 
approach to legal policy from two prominent figures in the economic analysis of law). 
13. Craswell, supra note 2, at 349–50. 
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behavior vis-à-vis naïfs14—which Ben-Shahar and Schneider 
systematically ignore.15 Moreover, even the “static” benefit of improved 
decisionmaking appears to be more common than one might conclude 
after reading Ben-Shahar’s and Schneider’s Article.16 And indeed, they 
concede that mandated disclosure does not always generate zero 
benefits—that in fact sometimes it does achieve the goal of improving 
disclosees’ decisionmaking, at least partially. For example, in contexts 
where at least some disclosees are themselves relatively sophisticated, 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider concede that disclosure can 
“produce[] a desirable effect” not only for these sophisticated disclosees 
but for naïfs as well. These contexts—securities markets, hospital 
disclosures to insurers, and environmental disclosures to government 
agencies—arise when the responses of sophisticated disclosees have 
positive spillover effects for less sophisticated disclosees, increasing the 
magnitude of mandated disclosure’s aggregate benefits.17 So the 
allegation of failure at least excludes these contexts, which Ben-Shahar 
and Schneider claim are “few and far between.”18 
In other contexts, however, the failure alleged seems to lie not in the 
absence or rarity of improved disclosee decisionmaking, but in the 
identity of disclosees whose decisionmaking is improved. Here, 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider claim that mandated disclosure 
generates “inequity” by benefiting more sophisticated disclosees but not 
more naïve ones—it helps those who least need it, they say.19 Perhaps 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider intend this argument to establish 
that the magnitude of a disclosure’s benefits is relatively small, but the 
use of the term “inequity” implies some type of distributive criteria that I 
will explore further below.20 And of course, embedded in even this 
argument against mandated disclosure is an admission that cuts against 
the overall claim of failure: disclosure does in fact improve the 
decisionmaking of at least some (relatively more sophisticated) 
disclosees.21 
So if mandated disclosure is “failing” despite at least partial 
achievement of the goals Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider have set 
                                                     
14. Id. at 354–72. 
15. Id. at 370. 
16. Id. at 335 & nn.4–5. 
17. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 732. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 740–42. 
20. See infra Parts III–IV. 
21. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 740. 
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for it, we face one of two possibilities. The first is that the accusation of 
failure rests on a view that the perfect is the enemy of the good—that 
anything short of total success is rightly considered a failure.22 I do not 
understand them to be making this argument. Instead, I believe they are 
arguing the second possibility: that whatever successes mandated 
disclosure has in achieving the goals set for it are outweighed by other 
undesirable features of mandated disclosure regimes—their costs. If we 
are to accept this claim, we must identify these undesirable features, 
assess what makes them undesirable, and understand how we are to 
weigh them against mandated disclosure’s admitted successes. 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider extensively document the 
significant pecuniary and other burdens disclosure mandates impose on 
disclosers—even well-meaning ones—as well as on policymakers 
charged with implementing the regimes.23 But these costs, by 
assumption, ultimately flow from an attempt to influence disclosees’ 
behavior—to improve their decisions. And it is precisely the complexity 
of human cognition and decision-making behaviors that renders 
formulation of and compliance with disclosure mandates so costly to 
those who engage in it. 
Figuring out how to provide information that will improve disclosees’ 
decisionmaking, and then providing that information in useful ways, is 
exceedingly and perhaps impossibly difficult. This is so because 
disclosees’ inherent capacity to improve their decisionmaking by 
incorporating new information is sharply limited. Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider ably review relevant limits on disclosee capacity, framing 
them on the one hand as costs of disclosure regimes to disclosees 
themselves in time, attention, and effort, and on the other hand as 
obstacles to realizing benefits from disclosures such as limited cognitive 
capacity and forms of cognitive bias.24 
But these features of disclosee decisionmaking are not really 
“costs”—that is, results—of mandated disclosure regimes; they are the 
root cause of any alleged disparity between costs and benefits. If the 
benefits of disclosure are low it is because many disclosees lack the 
capacity to realize those benefits; if the costs are high it is because 
inherent limits on disclosee capacity make it difficult to attain the end 
we have set for mandated disclosure—the improvement of disclosee 
decisions. In short, the source of mandated disclosure’s “failure”—if 
                                                     
22. See also Craswell, supra note 2, at 338 (“Set the bar for success high enough, and every 
disclosure is a failure.”). 
23. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 679–704. 
24. Id. at 704–29. 
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indeed the allegation of failure rests on an assertion that disclosures’ 
costs exceed their benefits to sophisticated disclosees—lies in the nature 
of disclosee decisionmaking itself. 
III. CUI BONO? 
Putting disclosee decisionmaking at the center of the problem of 
mandated disclosure complicates not only Professors Ben-Shahar’s and 
Schneider’s critique, but also Professor Craswell’s efforts to partially 
rebut that critique. This is because the messiness of disclosee 
decisionmaking necessarily displaces the fundamental normative 
principle underlying their analyses—welfare-maximization—with other, 
less quantifiable normative principles that ultimately collapse into the 
autonomy principle all three authors attempt to elide. It forces us to 
choose winners and losers not by reference to costs, but by reference to 
judgments about moral responsibility for our own cognitive capacities. 
To understand why, we can begin with Professor Craswell’s effort to 
formalize what we mean by “improved” decisionmaking—an effort 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider never take up. Improvement—in 
Professor Craswell’s view—lies in the correction of decision-makers’ 
erroneous beliefs. Thus, where a product quality has an objective value 
s, a disclosure will improve disclosees’ decisionmaking if it moves their 
own subjective assessment of that value, r, closer to s than it would have 
been absent the disclosure.25 
This framing of the criterion of improvement is problematic for two 
reasons. First, it assumes that r deterministically affects a consumer’s 
decision to purchase a product.26 And second, it treats all consumers as if 
both their assessments of r and the function according to which they 
translate r into a purchasing decision are the same.27 Professor 
Craswell’s model requires these assumptions to be mathematically 
tractable, and such assumptions are exceedingly common in the 
economic analysis of law. But when analyzing a legal regime whose key 
feature is the limits of human cognition and decisionmaking, these types 
of assumptions obscure far more than they clarify. 
This is because both assumptions are demonstrably false, as 
                                                     
25. Craswell, supra note 2, at 340–42. 
26. Id. at 381 (assuming that where consumers know the actual value of s, they “respond to 
sellers’ choices by choosing the quantity they purchase”); id. at 382–84 (adding the complication of 
a divergence between consumers’ subjective estimate of s and its true value). 
27. Id. at 381 (assuming for purposes of the model that all consumers are the same in all 
respects). 
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Professors Ben-Shahar’s and Schneider’s analysis—particularly their 
discussion of inequity28—suffices to demonstrate. This might not be a 
grievous fault if the assumptions had a trivial effect on the outcome of 
the analysis—if they provided a good enough approximation of actual 
behavior to generate useful results.29 But not only are the assumptions 
false, they are false in a way that can make a qualitative difference in our 
assessments of the costs and benefits of a legal regime that purports to 
influence human decisionmaking. 
Divergences from the rational decision-making behavior Professor 
Craswell’s model assumes are common, but heterogeneously distributed. 
In particular, cognitive biases and other cognitive limitations are not 
equally exhibited across persons, nor even by the same person across 
time and situations.30 They are probabilistic rather than deterministic—
distribution curves rather than linear relationships or binary switches—
and they are subject to change with iteration.31 This does not simply 
make it difficult to determine the magnitude of any increase in welfare 
attributable to an improvement in disclosee decisionmaking, it also 
means that the magnitude and even the sign of the aggregate effect of a 
disclosure on disclosees’ decisions (and thus their welfare) depends 
heavily on the distribution of cognitive capacities in the population of 
disclosees and across time. 
Turning again to Professor Craswell’s model, imagine that r is not a 
theoretically ideal disclosee’s estimate of s but rather a parameter 
representing the estimate of each actual disclosee. Suppose further that 
there are two classes of disclosees: naïfs and sophisticates. For the 
sophisticates, a particular disclosure may move r closer to s, while for 
the naïfs a disclosure actually moves r farther from s, though within each 
class the degree of this effect may vary around the class mean. In this 
                                                     
28. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 740–42. 
29. Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 355, 357 
(Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006). 
30. See generally Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be 
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002). 
31. For example, learning from one’s own mistakes, or those of other disclosees, could 
theoretically make mandated disclosures more effective over time. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, 
Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 113–15 
(2006). Indeed, there is at least some evidence that they do. Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical 
Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803, 811–13 (2008) (citing Sumit Agarwal et 
al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over the Lifecycle (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of Econ. 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-11, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=973790). However, there is also evidence that sometimes individuals show 
considerable resistance to learning, as I have previously discussed in the consumer context. Jeremy 
N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1284–95 (2011). 
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case, the aggregate effect of disclosure just on disclosees themselves 
would depend significantly on the relative size of each class of disclosee 
and the discrete effect of the disclosure on each class—that is, on the 
distribution of cognitive capacities. 
There is certainly reason to believe that this hypothetical is a more 
accurate description of actual human cognition than Professor Craswell’s 
mathematical model. Indeed, in Professor Craswell’s response, he notes 
a study that shows that disclosures of information appear to increase the 
accuracy of some disclosee beliefs even as they appear to decrease the 
accuracy of other, related beliefs.32 The study does not reveal whether 
the same disclosees experienced these different effects, or rather whether 
some disclosees’ experienced a pure benefit or a pure harm from the 
disclosure in terms of the accuracy of their beliefs.33 And of course, for 
many disclosees there was likely no effect at all.34 Similarly, some 
studies appear to show that disclosures merely exaggerate preexisting 
differences in the quality of decisions that members of the disclosee 
population make. For example, the effects of a disclosure that the claims 
in advertisements for a nutritional supplement “have not been evaluated 
by the [FDA]”35 appear to be somewhat correlated to education levels.36 
Holding these constant, such a disclosure appears to have no effect on 
disclosees’ belief in the veracity of an advertisement’s health claims, 
which are more likely to be believed by those with a higher background 
trust in government or a higher belief in the efficacy of nutritional 
supplements generally.37 
The interaction between the distribution of cognitive capacities and 
the distribution of costs and benefits of mandated disclosure regimes 
greatly complicates the task of normatively justifying those regimes, 
even before we come to the point of netting disclosure’s effect on 
disclosees against the costs of disclosure to others. In the first instance, it 
means the welfarist must jettison Paretian criteria of justification in favor 
of something more like Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.38 Once we do this, we 
                                                     
32. Craswell, supra note 2, at 348–50 (citing Cornelia Pechmann, Do Consumers Overgeneralize 
One-Sided Comparative Price Claims, and Are More Stringent Regulations Needed?, 33 J. MARKET 
RES. 150 (1996)). 
33. Pechmann, supra note 33, at 157–58, 158 tbl.3. 
34. See id. 
35. 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(c)(2) (2012). 
36. See Karen Russo France & Paula Fitzgerald Bone, Policy Makers’ Paradigms and Evidence 
from Consumer Interpretations of Dietary Supplement Labels, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF. 27, 35–37, 46 
(2005). 
37. Id. 
38. Lewis Kornhauser, The Economic Analysis of Law, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
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are faced with the task of trying to reduce the potentially 
incommensurate values held by admittedly heterogeneous subjects of the 
legal regime to a single cardinal metric. In doing so, we must of 
necessity make normative judgments regarding the appropriate weight to 
be given to the subjective values held by particular subjects or classes of 
subjects of the regime in question—judgments with which at least some 
holders of those subjective beliefs are likely to disagree.39 Finally, 
adding in the costs to policymakers and disclosers requires these 
normatively fraught exercises to be repeated all over again. 
As I noted above,40 cost-benefit analysis entails two steps: assigning 
valuations and then summing them. Valuation necessarily precedes 
aggregation, and it is an inescapably normative and indeed distributive 
exercise. Professor Craswell seems to recognize this facet of cost-benefit 
analysis as a genuine theoretical difficulty,41 whereas Professors Ben-
Shahar and Schneider seem to be content to use it as simply more 
ammunition against disclosure mandates.42 But the fact remains that 
some disclosees will very likely benefit from whatever disclosure is 
mandated; like their disclosers they can now be considered sophisticated, 
as contrasted with the naïfs who fall on the wrong side of the cognitive 
distribution and do not benefit from (or are injured by) the disclosure in 
question. 
Indeed, all disclosure mandates impose some costs on one or more 
segments of society. We are operating under the assumption that they do 
so in order to shift some other segment from the category of naïfs to the 
category of sophisticates—from those who make what we would 
consider “bad” decisions to those who make what we would consider 
“good” (or at least “better”) decisions. And so in setting and 
implementing such a mandate, policymakers and disclosers are 
inevitably—even if unintentionally—choosing a point on the continuum 
                                                     
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/legal-
econanalysis/ (identifying cost-benefit analysis with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency); Richard A. Posner, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1153 (2000) (same). 
39. Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 815, 833–35 (1990). 
40. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
41. Craswell, supra note 2, at 350 (“[H]ow we value any improvement (or any decline) in the 
accuracy of consumers’ beliefs is a question that cannot be answered by mathematical calculations. 
Instead, it requires a fundamental value judgment about the importance of a better- or worse-
informed citizenry compared to the value of other uses to which the money might otherwise have 
been put. Cost-benefit analysis is a useful way to highlight the importance of these value questions, 
but it does not always provide an uncontroversial way of answering them.”). 
42. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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of capacities at which the naïfs will be separated from the sophisticates. 
When we ask whether the benefits to those disclosees justify the costs, 
then, we are inevitably asking whether we have drawn this line in the 
right place. But where a legal regime performs such a sorting function 
based on capacities rather than preferences, cost-benefit analysis of the 
regime ceases to be an optimization exercise and takes on more nakedly 
normative and distributive dimensions. 
IV. COGNITIVE DIFFERENCES AND POSITIONAL 
PREFERENCES 
We cannot decide where to draw the line between naïfs and 
sophisticates without taking a position on debatable normative questions 
that are independent of any concern for efficiency. For example, 
consider that for many individuals, positional preferences may be a 
stronger determinant of subjective welfare than absolute preferences.43 
Any cost-benefit analysis—i.e., any judgment concerning a policy 
choice’s efficiency—must therefore inevitably decide how to weigh, for 
example, the absolute preferences of those in a relatively better position 
against the positional preferences of those in a relatively worse 
position.44 Professor Hovenkamp helpfully illustrates the point: 
Is there much doubt, for example, that a woman’s sense of 
well-being may be affected not merely by her absolute earnings, 
but also by whether she earns the same amount as a male 
performing the same work? That a black school child’s sense of 
well-being depends not merely on the absolute quality of his 
educational opportunities, but also on how those opportunities 
compare with those of white children? That taxpayers are 
concerned not merely with the absolute amount they must pay, 
but also with their relative burden compared to others?45 
As a society we have taken a normative stance on these types of 
positional preferences, particularly those grounded in, for example, 
gender and race. But that normative stance seems to have little to do 
with a cardinalized comparison of the positional and absolute 
preferences of those subject to our legal regimes and more to do with 
                                                     
43. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757 
(2009); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Absolute Preferences and Relative Preferences in Property Law, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 2157 (2012). 
44. See Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
913, 921–27 (2000) (discussing the challenge of measuring positional preferences and incorporating 
them into cost-benefit analysis). 
45. Hovenkamp, supra note 39, at 837 (footnote omitted). 
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moral claims regarding the appropriate bases for distributional 
differences—claims typically grounded in understandings of dignity, 
moral agency, and desert. 
To these familiar examples of social inequality we may now add the 
relatively novel dimension of cognitive inequality, and see whether it 
invokes similar normative commitments regarding distribution. When 
attempting to calculate the social utility that a mandated disclosure 
generates as part of some cost-benefit analysis, we will inevitably have 
to answer uncomfortable questions. Specifically, we must discuss 
whether and how we ought to weigh the negative utility that naïfs 
realize—by virtue of being in an inferior position relative to 
sophisticates—against the absolute losses to the sophisticates that would 
attend any effort to improve the naïfs’ relative position through law. 
Given the examples of mandated disclosure regimes discussed by 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider, we can thus add to Professor 
Hovenkamp’s list the credit-worthy borrower who realizes she got a 
more expensive mortgage than her equally credit-worthy neighbor,46 the 
cable television consumer who discovers he is barred from joining the 
class action begun by another customer of the same cable company,47 
and the patient who died of a disease others avoided by undergoing a 
screening procedure she mistakenly believed to be unduly risky.48 One 
question we might ask ourselves is whether these examples trigger the 
same moral intuitions as the examples offered by Professor Hovenkamp. 
The answer to that question is not so clear, which is in itself 
interesting. We may very well be more willing to impose costs on, for 
example, the less careful and capable reader compared to the more 
careful and capable one by virtue of his lack of care and capacity than 
we are on, say, the female employee over the male one by virtue of her 
gender, or the black school child over the white one by virtue of his race. 
And this points to a feature of mandated disclosure regimes that 
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider discuss only in passing49: 
mandated disclosure can have the effect of apportioning moral 
responsibility for the injuries that befall the vulnerable onto the injured 
                                                     
46. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 665–67. 
47. Id. at 741. 
48. Id. at 667–70; cf. id. at 682. 
49. Id. at 746 (“The ideological thrust of mandated disclosure—its origins in both market and 
autonomy theory—is to place choice, and thus risk and responsibility, onto the ill-informed and in-
expert person facing a novel and complex decision. That can have especially lamentable 
consequences for the vulnerable, but it also leaves ordinary people facing decisions ill-prepared and 
ill-equipped.”). 
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themselves. Given that the enactment and tailoring of a disclosure 
regime inevitably involve deciding where to draw the line between 
sophisticates and naïfs, we must recognize that these regimes inevitably 
imply a choice regarding the appropriate apportionment of moral 
responsibility for the consequences of what we might consider “bad” 
decisions. For some—the legislator who feels his obligation to respond 
to an injustice can be discharged by voting for a disclosure mandate, for 
example50—disclosure may well provide a plausible basis to justify 
certain distributive choices, even to the losing end of the distribution. 
Such justification may seem more plausible in the case of disclosure 
than in the case of other types of distributive choices precisely because 
the heterogeneity that generates the need for distributive choices—
heterogeneity in cognitive capacities—is a form of difference that we 
may tend to think is more within the control of moral agents than other 
forms of difference such as race or gender. “If you had been more 
careful, tried harder, or”—more problematically given the cost of 
education—“gotten a better education, perhaps you would have avoided 
the harm that has befallen you,” we might say. The unspoken subtext, of 
course, is: “Because you could have—indeed, should have—avoided the 
harm yourself, I am not morally responsible for it.” 
V. BRINGING MORAL DISCRIMINATION TO THE FORE 
I should say that I do not believe proponents of mandated disclosure 
themselves see this type of moral discrimination as a purpose of the 
regimes they espouse—at least not consciously. Nor do I claim that 
moral agents do in fact have more control over the types of capacities 
that can determine whether mandated disclosures will “work” for them 
than they have over other types of differences such as race or gender. 
Rather, I think this feature of mandated disclosure—its potential to serve 
as a moral salve and even a moral license—may well be a deep and 
underappreciated foundation underlying most regulatory regimes that are 
directed at human decisionmaking. As Professor Craswell notes, 
disclosure mandates do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they are one of a 
range of policy actions—or inactions—that might be adopted in 
response to the kinds of “trouble stories” that, in Professors Ben-
Shahar’s and Schneider’s telling, currently tend to generate new 
disclosure mandates.51 
                                                     
50. Id. at 684 (“In short, when lawmakers are besieged, mandated disclosure looks like rescue. Its 
critics are few. Lawmakers can be seen to have acted.”) (footnote omitted). 
51. Craswell, supra note 2, at 372–79. 
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Whenever we adopt a regulatory tool with the hope of influencing 
individual decisionmaking—be it a disclosure mandate, or an alternative 
such as a “nudge” or a change in architecture52—we are inevitably 
engaging in a distributive exercise across individuals who are 
heterogeneous not just in their preferences, nor even in their 
contributions to aggregate social utility, but also in their capacities.53 My 
claim is simply that this exercise necessarily entails judgments about the 
relationship between capacities and moral desert, and that those 
judgments are antecedent to any analysis of the costs and benefits of the 
regime. Whatever regime we adopt, we are acknowledging and 
accepting that some naïfs will still suffer as a result of decisions they 
make when interacting with sophisticates. Even where we purport to 
justify this result on a comparison of costs and benefits, we must 
necessarily do so by ascribing some values to those costs and benefits 
that those whose interests will be affected might legitimately disagree 
with. When we do so, we necessarily reject those alternative valuations. 
It seems to me that the only basis for rejecting these alternative 
valuations is that we believe those proffering them are attempting to 
shift costs onto others that they ought to bear themselves. But where 
those “costs” are the consequences of the distribution of cognitive 
capacities, a claim grounded in welfarism that those on the losing end of 
the distribution ought to bear the costs is meaningfully different from the 
classic cheapest-cost-avoider analysis54 that asks whether, say, a railroad 
company or a farmer ought to bear the risk of an accidental fire.55 The 
claim does not rest on a comparison of any social utility deliberately 
produced, consumed, or foregone by the subjects of the legal regime. 
Rather, it reduces to the proposition that those who end up on the wrong 
side of the divide between naïfs and sophisticates are more responsible 
for the consequences of their naïveté than the designers and the other 
subjects of the regime that drew the line in the first place. This is, to put 
it mildly, an audacious and highly contestable claim in any context. Yet 
it is precisely such a claim that is inherent in any legal or regulatory 
regime that aims to influence human decisionmaking against a 
                                                     
52. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
53. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law 
and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2123–24 (2008). 
54. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 135 (1970). 
55. See generally Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 352–54 
(1914) (Holmes, J., concurring in part); R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 
28–34 (1960). 
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background of heterogeneous capacities. 
My co-panelists for this symposium offer helpful illustrations of this 
principle. In the entertainment context Professor Said discusses, we 
might argue about how to value sophisticates’ enjoyment of an 
uninterrupted, immersive entertainment experience against the effects of 
sponsorship disclosures on those naïfs who might benefit from them.56 
But it would be foolish for us to expect the two groups affected by our 
legal regime to agree on how to do so. Instead, resolution of the question 
is likely to turn on normative judgments about the appropriateness of 
sophisticates enjoying an aesthetic experience at the expense of naïfs 
who run out to buy the latest sponsoring product without understanding 
how they have been influenced. To take the extreme case, an outright 
ban of tobacco product placements in entertainment products that might 
be consumed by minors may strike us as a superior alternative to 
disclosure of those placements, but I doubt the primary reason for that 
judgment rests on cost-benefit analysis. Or to the extent it does, it can 
only do so because we weigh the costs to a particular set of naïfs—
children—particularly heavily due to our assumptions about their 
responsibility for the choices they make in response to marketing 
embedded in entertainment. 
In the online context Professors Hartzog and Stutzman discuss,57 we 
might similarly argue about how to value the costs of designing and 
imposing alternative regimes grounded in technological and architectural 
features rather than regulation,58 and how to quantify the relative 
benefits to internet users of privacy regimes as opposed to obscurity 
regimes.59 But is the outcome of these exercises is extremely likely to 
turn on normative judgments about what circumstances justify 
subjecting the user of such networks to the consequences of their 
oversharing. This may have less to do with the costs of prophylactic 
architecture or disclosure than with other circumstances that are morally 
relevant to allocation of costs—for example, whether we think it is right 
that a human being be defined for the rest of their lives by the least 
prudent thing they ever did as a teenager in possession of a camera 
phone. 
I use the emotionally charged example of minors in these two 
scenarios to drive home the point: the distributive, and hence, moral 
                                                     
56. Zahr K. Said, Mandated Disclosure in Literary Hybrid Speech, 88 WASH. L. REV 419, 456–
64 (2013). 
57. Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385 (2013). 
58. Id. at 402–18. 
59. Id. at 390–402. 
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implications of heterogeneous capacities loom large in all contexts, for 
all disclosure regimes and for all possible policy alternatives. I would 
encourage us to take them as the starting point in our regulatory design 
rather than obscure them in the footnotes of a cost-benefit calculation 
that can only be performed after making far more difficult normative 
commitments. 
CONCLUSION 
Moral comparisons among the subjects of a legal regime are inherent 
in any cost-benefit analysis that evaluates the effects of the regime on a 
population with heterogeneous cognitive capacities. Drawing such 
comparative judgments and imposing their inevitable distributive 
consequences is bound to be an uncomfortable task for a policymaker in 
a pluralist society with liberal democratic ideals—it evokes all the 
destabilizing power struggles of Cicero’s optimates and populares;60 of 
Nietzsche’s masters and slaves.61 But the discomfort of facing these 
distributive choices is no excuse for pretending we are not making them. 
If we think that disclosure mandates are failures, it must be not only 
because they are costly but also because those who do benefit from the 
disclosures ought not benefit at the expense of others who will bear the 
cost. Conversely, if we conclude they are successful, it will only be 
because we think the naïfs who benefit ought to be protected at the 
expense of others. These normative dimensions of policy design will 
present themselves in any legal regime that purports to influence human 
decisionmaking against a backdrop of heterogeneous capacities—which 
is to say, nearly every legal regime. As we continue to learn more about 
the nature and limits of our own decisionmaking capacities, we will have 
to become more comfortable answering the types of normative questions 
this type of policy-making forces on us. 
 
                                                     
60. CICERO: SPEECH ON BEHALF OF PUBLIUS SESTIUS 32 (Robert A. Kaster trans., 2006). 
61. See generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (Keith Ansell-
Pearson ed., Carol Diethe trans., Cambridge University Press 1994). 
